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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
adjoining circuit and could hear testimony on the issue. In this
manner the parties would be before the court and a more complete
and thorough inquiry could be achieved.
.Tam'es Clark Gardill
Criminal Law-Vicarious Liability-Robber Convicted of
Murder when Robbery Victim Killed Accomplice
Daniels and Smith entered a liquor store to commit a robbery.
While holding the managers, Mr. and Mrs. West, at gunpoint, they
repeatedly threatened to kill them if they did not cooperate. Mrs.
West drew a pistol and shot Smith, who later died from his wounds.
Taylor, a third accomplice waiting outside in the getaway car, was
arrested and charged with both robbery and the murder of Smith.
A motion to set aside the murder indictment was denied and Taylor
appealed. Held: Affirmed. Although the petitioner could not be
convicted under the felony-murder rule, he could be found guilty of
murder under the theory of vicarious liability. Taylor v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970).
The court recognized the rule of People v. Washington,' that
a felon could not be held liable under the felony-murder rule for a
killing committed by the victim. However, petitioner's liability was
predicated on a theory enunciated in Washington and People v.
Gilbert2 that one may be held vicariously responsible for a killing
committed by another where the defendant or his accomplice intended
to kill, or with a conscious disregard for life committed acts likely
to result in death. Washington and Gilbert both noted that where
defendants initiate gun battles, such initiation would constitute an
act done in total disregard of life and likely to result in death. The
majority in Taylor found that pointing the gun at the victims and
threatening lethal force if the victims did not cooperate "was suffi-
ciently provocative of lethal resistance to lead a man of ordinary
caution and prudence to conclude that Daniels and Smith 'initiated'
the gun battle, or that such conduct was done with conscious dis-
regard for human life and with natural consequences dangerous to
life."13
'62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
2 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
3 Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 584, 477 P.2d 131, 135, 91
Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 (1970).
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In Washington a service station manager was in his office when
he heard someone yell "Robbery!" One of the robbers entered the
office and pointed a gun at the manager, who immediately shot and
killed the robber. Washington, the accomplice, was convicted of
murder. In reversing the conviction the court held that where the
killing was committed by the victim, malice aforethought was not
imputed to the robber since the killing was not actually committed
by him. The court rejected the proximate cause theory of establishing
defendant's guilt4 and held that the California Murder Statute re-
quired that the homicide had to be committed by the felon himself or
an accomplice.
The Taylor majority distinguished Taylor from Washington on
the theory that in the latter the defendants merely pointed a gun at
the victim while in the former the defendants verbally communicated
the threats to use the gun if necessary.6
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Peters stated that the effect of
the majority opinion was to reinstate a particular application of the
felony-murder rule abolished by Washington. He thought it absurd
"that robbers who point guns at their victims without articulating
the obvious threat inherent in such action cannot be convicted of
murder for a killing committed by the victims, whereas robbers who
point guns at their victims and articulate their threat can be convicted
of murder in the same situation."7 Moreover, Justice Peters main-
tained that the majority totally ignored the concept of Washington and
Gilbert that criminal culpability should be based upon the acts of the
defendant, not upon the acts of the victims. The majority's factual
4 For critical comments on the role of proximate cause in establishing
criminal liability, see, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1565, 1566 (1958); 16 HAST. L.J. 620,
624 (1965); 38 S. CA.. L. REv. 698, 703 (1965).
5 
CAL. PEN. CODE § 189.
"Murder; degrees. All murder which is perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of wilful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, or any act punishable under § 288, is murder of the first
degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree."
California's statute is substantially similar to W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, §
1 (Michie 1966), infra note 27.
1 Justice Burke, who wrote the Taylor majority opinion dissented vigorously
in People v. Washington. Justice Burke's distinction between Taylor and
Washington is less convincing when read in light of his Washington dissent
in which he stated that anytime a victim shoots first when confronted by a
robber with a deadly weapon, the robber should be regarded as having
initiated the gun battle. He reached that conclusiodi in Washington despite the
lack of verbal threats.
7 3 Cal. 3d at 585, 477 P.2d at 135, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
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distinction was also criticized as being legally insignificant by Justice
Mosk in his dissenting opinion. He noted that the elements of force
and fear are necessary components of the crime of robbery and that
"every such conditional threat-whether express or implied-is in-
herent in the commission of the robbery itself."8 He contended that
the threats were merely incidental to the robbery and did not
materially increase the danger of harm to the victims.
The majority in Taylor cited People v. Reed9 as authority for
the contention that gun battles could be initiated without firing the
first shot. However, Reed is clearly distinguishable from Taylor in
that Reed involved a hostage situation where the victim was used as
a shield. Murder convictions in the "shield" cases have been based on
the theory that malice is expressed by such conduct because one
forces another into an extremely dangerous position against his
will.
0
Taylor is in sharp contrast to the recent trend in California
toward an increasingly narrow application of the felony-murder rule."
Indeed, prior to Taylor, it appeared that the application of the rule
had been severely limited."2 In light of Justice Burke's dissenting
opinion in Washington3 and the material similarity in facts between
8 Id. at 593, 477 P.2d at 141, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
9 270 Cal. App. 2d 37, 75 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1969). When the police arrived
at the scene of a robbery, the defendant was holding the victim at gunpoint and
refused the officers' order to surrender. As the defendant pointed his gun
at the head of the victim, the officers started firing and accidentally killed
the hostage. Affirming the robber's conviction of murder, the court held that
under these circumstances the defendant initiated the gun battle.
o Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 229, 261 A.2d 550,
556 (1970); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 508, 137 A.2d 472, 482
(1958); Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. REv. 50, 63 (1956). See also Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846,
68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125
(1900).
" People v. Sears, 2 Cal. 3d 180, 465 P.2d 847, 84 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1970) (felony-murder rule did not apply where the burglary was a separate
and independent felony); People v. Wilson, 1 Cal. 3d 431, 462 P.2d 22, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1969) (burglary cannot support first degree felony-murder con-
viction where the felonious intent of the burglary is assault with a deadly
weapon); People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1969) (assault with a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense of homicide
and cannot be used as a basis for California's second degree felony-murder
rule)' 21 In note, The California Supreme Court Assaults the Felony-Murder
Rule, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1970), the writer contends that the felony-
murder rule would not be applicable to forcible rape, armed robbery, or
burglary.
" 62 Cal. 2d at 785, 402 P.2d at 135, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Justice
Burke argued that application of Cal. PEN. CODE § 189 did not require that the
killing be committed by the felon, and that Washington should have been
convicted under the felony-murder rule.
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Washington and Taylor, it would appear that Taylor has revived the
felony-murder rule under a different name.
In other jurisdictions, the issue of a felon's responsibility for a
killing committed by one other than a participant in the crime has
been met squarely as an issue of the applicability of the felony-
murder rule. In People v. Austin" the Supreme Court of Michigan
held that it would be an unwarranted extension of the felony-murder
rule to convict the robber for a killing committed by the intended
victim of the robbery. In ruling as it did, the court refused to ex-
tend the ruling of People v. Podolski'" in which one of the robbers
was held liable for the murder of a police officer who was accidential-
ly killed by another officer in a gun battle which ensued after the
robbery.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v.
Almeida"6 affirmed a murder conviction of a robber when a police-
man, in attempting to stop a robbery in progress, shot and killed an
innocent bystander. The Almeida rule was extended in Common-
wealth v. Thomas"7 to hold the surviving robber guilty of murder for
the killing of his accomplice by the intended victim of the robbery.
Then in Commonwealth v. Redline,'8 the court expressly overruled
Thomas restricted the application of Almeida to the particular facts
presented. The court stated that Almeida was a judicial extension of
the felony-murder rule."' The rationale of Redline was that as to the
victim of the robbery "the homicide was justifiable and, obviously,
could not be availed of, on any rational legal theory, to support a
charge of murder."20 Finally, in Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v.
Myers,' the court expressly overruled Almeida and in general ques-
tioned the validity of the felony-murder rule. 2
14 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963); See 66 W. VA. L. REv. 129
(1964).'s 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
16 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
17 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955). For a critical comment on this
case, see 58 W. VA. L. REv. 415 (1956).
18 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
19'ld. at 490, 137 A.2d at 473. The court stated that the power to define
crimes and penalities lay exclusively with the legislature.201 d. at 509, 137 A.2d at 483; In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa.
639, 685, 117 A.2d 204, 224-25 (1955) Justice Musmanno expressed similar
sentiments: "Should the courts be placed in the preposterous situation of
trying a murder case where no murder was committed?"
21 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). Smith was Almeida's accomplice
in the crime for which they were both convicted.
22 d. at 227, 261 A.2d at 555. The court, after stating that it was not
abolishing the felony-murder rule, noted that "we do want to make clear
how shaky are the basic premises on which it rests."
4
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Several jurisdictions have considered the issue of vacarious
criminal liability for homicides not committed by the defendant. In
the absence of a showing that the act was committed by the defendant
or his accomplice, or that the case involved the "shield" situation, the
recent trend has been toward not holding the defendant liable for
murder.23 The Model Penal Code also expressly suggests a restricted
application of the felony-murder rule. 4
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not decided
the issue presented in Taylor. Some statements made by the court
regarding the felony-murder rule indicate that the court may require
the act to be that of the defendant25 or his accomplice. 6 It must be
noted, however, that those causes did not involve homicides com-
mitted by one other than the felon, and the court did not anticipate
the issue of vicarious liability.
Aside from the inferences that may be drawn from the case
law, a cogent argument can be made against application of the felony-
23 Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Common-
wealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); People v. Austin,
370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167
N.E.2d 736 (1960); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261
A.2d 550 (1970); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472
(1958). See generally Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934);
People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Butler v. People, 125 Ill.
641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888).
24 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2 (b), Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). In discussing the felony-murder rule, the comment states:
Such homocides will only constitute murder if they are committed
purposely or knowingly, or recklessly where the recklessness demon-
strates extreme indifference to the value of human life, subject, how-
ever, to a presumption of such recklessness if the actor is com-
mitting robbery, rape by force or its equivalent, rape by intimida-
tion, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. If the pre-
sumption of extreme recklessness is rebutted, the homicide may
still be adjudged reckless, in which event it constitutes manslaughter,
as do all reckless homicides, whether the actor's conduct is otherwise
felonious or not. See Section 201.3. Beyond this, we submit that the
felony-murder doctrine, as a basis for establishing the criminality
of homicide, should be abandoned.
25 See State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 606, 57 S.E.2d 513, 527 (1949).
The court in discussing the statutory felony-murder rule stated that under the
statute, "a person who kills another person, in committing or attempting to
commit robbery, with no motive for the homicide other than robbery, is
guilty of first degree murder." (emphasis supplied).
2 6 See State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617, 631, 141 S.E. 7, 12 (1927). An
instruction on the application of the felony-murder rule stated that if the
jury believed that the deceased came to her death as a result of injuries in-
flicted upon her by the defendant or his accomplice in committing the act
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murder rule to a situation similar to the facts in Taylor. The West
Virginia Code defines only the degrees of murder." Whether a
murder has in fact occurred must be decided by reference to the com-
mon law, and once established, the statute operates only to determine
the degree. Accordingly, before the statutory felony-murder rule
can be applied, the corpus delicti of murder must be established.
The corpus delicti is shown by proving (a) a death, and (b) the
existence of a criminal agency.29 Where the victim of a robbery kills
one of the robbers, it is justifiable homicide?' Therefore, the criminal
agency necessary to establish the corpus delicti is lacking. It neces-
sarily follows that since no murder was committed, the surviving
robber cannot be convicted of a crime which never occurred."
Taylor v. Superior Court represents a revival of the felony-
murder rule in California and is contrary to a recent judicial move-
ment toward limiting application of that rule. Moreover, the decision
could become a foundation for repudiation of previous decisions in




Charles A. Cogar was indicted by the Webster County Circuit
Court for damaging and destroying approximately $890 worth of
realty belonging to a local resident. The indictment followed the lan-
guage of West Virginia's malicious mischief statute,' except that
it contained the word "feloniously" instead of the phrase "but not
feloniously" as set forth in the statute. Cogar pleaded guilty and was
27 W. VA. CODE ch 61, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1966):
"Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by
any wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission
of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, robbery or burglary, is
murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the
second degree."
28 63 Cal. 2d at 705, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal Rptr. at 918; 105 U. PA.
L. Rav. at 59.
"State v. Stevenson, 147 W. Va. 211, 214, 127 S.E.2d 638, 641 (1962).
30 Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949). See
State v. Hamric, 151 W. Va. 1, 18, 151 S.E.2d 252, 263-64 (1966); State v.
Cain, 20 W. Va. 679 (1882).
31 A contrary result may prove inherently contradictory. See supra
note 20.
1 W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art, 3, § 30 (Michie Supp. 1971).
6
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